There is great uncertainty regarding the strategy that Donald Trump’s second administration will adopt regarding Venezuela. However, analysts consulted in Miami and Washington agree on one thing: the Trump of 2018-2019 will not be repeated, who opted for “maximum pressure” and a regime of severe sanctions to provoke a regime change with Juan Guaidó as leader. Nor will he be the Trump of 2020, who opted for a way of life with Nicolás Maduro, described as a “tough nut to crack,” while expressing frustration with Guaidó, whom he considered “lazy.” The Trump of the future could be a combination of both approaches.
“It’s hard to predict what Trump will do, but you can extrapolate from his first administration,” says Geoff Ramsey, an analyst at the Atlantic Council in Washington. “Trump went from maximum pressure, and even considering a military option, to adopting a much more moderate stance based on negotiations.” This appears to be the position of the new administration. “There are hawks who will advocate for a tougher policy, but no one speaks for Trump,” Ramsey adds.
Trump did not meet with Edmundo González before Maduro’s inauguration
Since his election victory in November, Trump has said little about Venezuela, limiting himself to a message on social media last week in which he warned against harming María Corina Machado, the de facto leader of the opposition, who is in Venezuela. Trump’s decision, in the days before Nicolás Maduro’s inauguration, not to meet in Washington with the exiled opposition candidate Edmundo González “is very significant,” says Ramsey.
The announcement last month that Richard Grenell will be the envoy for special missions in the new administration could be an indication of a possible negotiation with Maduro. In September 2020, Trump sent Grenell to Caracas to negotiate a way out of the crisis with Jorge Rodríguez, Maduro’s right arm.
Mural of the Chavista leader Nicolás Maduro in the center of Caracas
Another clue comes from the new Republican senator from Ohio Bernie Moreno, born in Colombia, who surprised many observers when he stated in an interview in a Colombian media that the Trump administration will negotiate with Maduro, since “he is the one who is going to take office; “The United States does not decide who leads in other countries.”
Although the historical veracity of this statement is debatable, it seems to reflect a rejection of neoconservative policies of regime change. “Trump will not base his policy on Venezuela on governance issues,” says Javier Corrales, from Amherst University, who represented Juan Guaidó’s team in Washington in 2019.
However, there will be no shortage of neoconservatives in the new administration. Marco Rubio, a veteran of the ideologized politics of Cuban exile in Miami, will be confirmed this month as Secretary of State. Mauricio Claver-Carone, head of Latin American policy, has been the main anti-Castro lobbyist in Miami. Mike Waltz, another Florida hawk, will be the national security advisor, a position held in the first administration by John Bolton, architect of the failed regime change plan with Guaidó as the protagonist. “I don’t see a shift toward pragmatism until Trump takes on Rubio, which could happen soon or never,” says Mike Bustamante of the University of Miami.
The Florida neoconservatives will try to convince Trump that Maduro’s alliances with Iran, China and Russia endanger American national security and the plan to establish a new Monroe Doctrine in the region that guarantees American hegemony. From there, they will defend more pressure to promote regime change.
One of the priority issues for Trump is immigration, especially his controversial commitment to deport the eleven million undocumented immigrants in the United States, of which 270,000 are Venezuelans. “If Trump wants to deport Venezuelans, Maduro will have to agree to receive them, which would make sense in a possible negotiation with Maduro,” says Daniel Pedreira, a political scientist at Florida International University.
Another critical issue is oil, although there are disagreements about the importance of Venezuelan crude oil for an administration that intends to promote a new phase of fracking in USA
From there emerges the consensus: Trump will probably negotiate with Maduro in search of agreements on immigration and oil. However, he will be very attentive to any signs of divisions within power in Venezuela to intensify sanctions. There are already some signs of weakness, according to Beatrice Rangel, former chief of staff of former President Carlos Andrés Pérez, currently based in Miami. “There is dissension in Chavismo, and María Corina Machado is the person needed for maximum pressure to work,” he says. It may be true, but Trump will remember that his advisors, led by Bolton and Rubio, told him this same thing in 2019 about Juan Guaidó.
Source: www.lavanguardia.com
