Europe’s energy dependence on Russia remains, more than two years after the invasion of Ukraine, with regional differences in energy access and measures, concluded the Francisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation and Brookings.
This is the conclusion of the study “The troubled divorce of Russian gas in Europe”, written by Samantha Gross, a specialist in foreign policy, energy and climate policy, and Constanze Stelzenmüller, director of the center for studies on Europe and the United States at the Brookings Institution, the result of a partnership between the Francisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation (FFMS) and that North American institution, with the collaboration of the Luso-American Foundation for Development (FLAD).
For the authors, “Europe remains, for now, largely dependent on imported gas, having limited itself to diversifying its suppliers and increasing its relative dependence on LNG (liquefied natural gas), which is more expensive”.
The study says that Europe’s response after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was swift “and unimaginable before the conflict”, but hides regional differences in access to energy and measures taken, which will make a unified political response difficult in the future.
Additionally, the authors point out that the reduction in demand and substitution by LNG has represented serious losses for energy-intensive industries, controversial subsidies, protectionist policies and increased political tensions between European countries.
“This is, therefore, an incomplete trajectory and exposed to future risks, such as the continued blackmail against European countries that continue to import Russian gas, the end of the Ukrainian gas circulation agreement, a possible Trump victory in the United States presidential elections in November, or the high volatility that is typical of the LNG market”, the analysis points out.
Before the war in Ukraine, over 40% of Europe’s natural gas imports came from Russia, its largest single supplier, with some European countries relying on Russia for over 80% of their gas supplies, with Germany being the largest customer of Russian gas in terms of volume, importing almost twice the volume of Italy, the second largest.
In 2023, Europe would still import 14.8% of its total gas supply globally from Russia, with 8.7% arriving via pipelines and 6.1% in the form of LNG.
The study also warns of the need to address key policy questions in the near future: “What should be the roles of markets and governments in managing the gas economy and distributing scarce resources? If security of gas supply is now part of Europe’s overall security stance on an interdependent, open and globalised continent, what does this mean for the status of essential infrastructure and energy companies? What role should the EU play in integrating the European gas market and addressing distribution inequalities and protectionist fiscal policy responses? And finally, how does all this fit into the transatlantic alliance? Should energy security be part of NATO’s remit and, if so, in what form?”
This policy paper is part of a series of six articles on Europe’s energy transition, which will be published by the end of 2025.
Source: rr.sapo.pt
