How seriously should Russian nuclear threats be taken? Could the thread suddenly break with Putin?

This article is not strictly a copy of Sergey Radchenko’s recently published book (To Run the World: The Kremlin’s Cold War Bid for Global Power) review. Rather, I would like to point out that to find in the book a new approach to the sources of Russian foreign policy behavior, in line with the famous 1947 study of the American diplomat George F. Kennan, which is “on the sources of Soviet behavior” he said. By focusing on the logic behind Soviet leaders’ foreign policy decisions, Radchenko hopes to help understand Russian President Vladimir Putin’s — often bloody — quest to regain Russia’s superpower status on a par with the United States.

From Joseph Stalin to Mikhail Gorbachev, Putin’s desire for “great power” prestige was also characteristic of Soviet leaders. Leonid Brezhnev, who succeeded Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, envisioned a world where the Soviet Union and the US “manages together”, and in which they respect each other as “equal parties”. But while the US agreed to the equal relationship on paper, Radchenko explains, the Soviets felt as if they had been “forced into the humiliating position of the guilty, who are currently being taught by someone who (to be honest) is also not blameless.”

Putin had similar experiences. Since coming to power almost a quarter of a century ago, it has sought to treat the US-led West as an equal.

There was a time when, for example, accepted NATOeven sought Russian membership. But he has always believed that Russia’s size and historical role on the international stage entitled it to special treatment: Russia is not an ordinary country, and the West should behave accordingly. According to this idea, the West must carefully consider how its decisions may affect Russia’s interests and risk perception.

However, the West thought otherwise.

When NATO in 2004 picked up three former Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Putin as an existential threat began to look at NATO.

However, Putin was greatly enraged by the prospect of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO: this was one of the main motives behind Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia.

This reaction may seem exaggerated, but it can be seen as a characteristically Russian move. According to Radchenko, Putin – like all Soviet leaders – shares the basic fear of Rodion Raskolnikov, the protagonist of Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s classic work Crime and Punishment: whoever does not react strongly to life’s humiliations is “a shivering creature”, who has no rights or interests that anyone can defend. Accepting that other powers ignore you, let alone act hostile, is simply not an option.

Putin has been clear about this from the beginning. When he took over the presidency in 2000, already then warned him the West, that if it pushes Russia away:

we will be forced to seek allies and strengthen ourselves. What else could we do?

So when the US openly supported the 2014 Maidan revolution in Ukraine, which led to the overthrow of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia seized Crimea.

US President Barack Obama’s reference to Russia as a “regional power” is sarcastic comment it only strengthened Putin’s determination to strengthen Russia’s global authority. In 2022, he proved how serious he was when he launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. If the West does not give Russia what it deserves, Putin will defend his interests with force. What else could he have done?

So when the Russian president says that becomes inevitable a NATO-Russia war if the US and UK allow Ukraine to fire Western long-range missiles at Russia – as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky he asked – should not be dismissed immediately. Although Putin did not openly threaten to use nuclear weapons – he only said that the changed nature of the conflict demanded a concrete response, and therefore the at the Russian nuclear doctrine now the activation threshold is lower – others in your environment even more directly hinted at this possibility.

It can be stated: it is not certain that such a step will occur. As one of the Washington Post’s headlines recently stated he noted: “Ukraine is constantly crossing Russian red lines. And Putin hesitates”. But this thinking can prove dangerous.

After all, the Kremlin has always followed a clear pattern of escalation: it resists increasing pressure for a while, but eventually the thread snaps.

So it is Putin’s decision not to react forcefully to Russia’s Kursk region Ukrainian invasiondoes not mean that you swallow anything. At some point, he will decide – with little care at what cost – that he has no choice but to prove that he is not a “shivering creature”. Missile strikes deep into Russian territory might even get him to that point.

For the most part, Western analysts are convinced that Russia will not actually use nuclear weapons since a nuclear war cannot be “won”. But a disturbing Dostoyevskyian logic suggests that for Putin, facing a nuclear strike against Russia may be the price of standing up to those who want to subjugate Russia. At least the Russians, suffering from burns and radioactive contamination, can be proud that they did not back down. And the Europeans who were also burned and exposed to radiation contamination can comfort themselves with the thought that they did not commit suicide.

The willingness of the West to regard Putin’s threats as mere lip service contradicts not only historical experience, but also its own opinion that Putin is ready to attack NATO countries as well. US President Joe Biden, for example, warned in August that Russia it will not stop at Ukraine. However, even here, the West fundamentally misunderstands Putin, who actually does not want to clash directly with NATO. The danger is that Putin may decide that the West has forced him into confrontation.

Kennan in 1997 that warnedthat NATO expansion is “expected to fuel” Russia’s “nationalist, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies” as it gives Russians the impression that their prestige – which has “always been paramount in Russian thinking” – and their security interests are being harmed . However, confrontations do not have to end in disaster, as Khrushchev demonstrated during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and Gorbachev demonstrated with his perestroika (reorganization) policy when Ronald Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative he answered. The challenge for the West is to ensure that the tragic confrontation in Ukraine does not become apocalyptic.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024.

www.project-syndicate.org

Nyina L. Khrushcheva
He is a professor of international relations at The New School in New York. He is a member of the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). In the 2000s, he was a researcher at the World Policy Institute. His research areas mainly include issues of Russian and international politics, global media, and the relationship between politics and culture.

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