Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has clearly drawn attention to the limitations of Europe’s self-defense capability, the capacity gaps of the European military industry, and the fact that the continent continues to rely on the defense guarantees of the United States in the management of international crises. The fact that the member states of the European Union have different defense policies, military capabilities and budget priorities makes it very difficult to develop a unified defense strategy. However, in light of Russian aggression and the potential second presidency of former US President Donald Trump – who has repeatedly threatened to reduce NATO’s defense guarantees – Europe must prepare to
take more responsibility for your own destiny.
On the effects of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the European military industry, new technological innovations, and the implementation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s “victory plan” Denis Mercier General, former Chief of Staff of the French Air Force and former Commander-in-Chief of NATO’s Federal Transformation Command was asked by Economx.
Based on your experience both in the French army and during NATO operations, how would you evaluate the impact of the war in Ukraine on European military industrial planning, and what are the most important lessons that Europe can learn when developing its future defense strategy?
The Russian-Ukrainian war has shown the limits of “conventional” warfare capabilities, which are now at the heart of defense planning. Also called kamikaze drones cruise ammunition using artificial intelligence to destroy tanks or other armored equipment with high precision and unparalleled success rate. The big advantage of these munitions is that they cost a few thousand euros at most and can be mass-produced, while targets often cost millions of euros and are difficult to replace.
This calls into question the existence of heavy armored equipment currently in use, as well as heavy artillery, as they compete with types of ammunition that can independently travel long distances and adapt to targets.
The new types of missiles (such as hypersonics), are part of an unstoppably evolving technology and pose a very significant threat to combat assets with large surface infrastructure, whether on land or at sea. Since the ground and air defense systems have become very effective, they prevent the acquisition of air superiority that was common before. Drones with high destructive power, similar to missiles, are easy to manufacture and accessible to “small countries”, which completely changes the balance of power.
The electronic warfare will also increase in value thanks to artificial intelligence. Space technology is becoming more and more important in defense systems, as instead of traditional, centralized control, the emphasis is placed on lighter, distributed systems that enable a wider use of space and exo-atmospheric space. Moreover, these systems are developed by the civilian sector and no longer necessarily serve as the technological base of the defense industry.
These lessons learned from the Ukrainian war clearly show that it is no longer exclusively the traditional defense industry players who are best suited to develop adaptive European self-defense capabilities. We need to support Ukraine in drawing conclusions while considering what lessons can be applied to the entire European defense industry. But one thing is certain: this war has shown how much the world has evolved, and at the same time requires a thorough questioning of current defense planning.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented his “victory plan” in the Ukrainian parliament and then to his international partners, in which he asked Western powers to, among other things, lift restrictions on long-range missiles against Russia, provide additional long-range military capabilities, and enable Ukraine’s long-term NATO membership. allies. Do you see the listed requests as feasible and do you agree with the Ukrainian president’s statement that the implementation of the plan can pave the way for Ukraine’s victory in the long term?
It is impossible for Ukraine to defend itself while remaining exclusively on its own territory without targeting the hubs from which the weapons attacking it originate. This does not mean that raids should be carried out everywhere in Russia. Russia is a nuclear-armed state, and any attack on its territory requires careful analysis so that they do not accidentally reach the threshold of using nuclear weapons. But targeting units attacking Ukraine, even if they are on Russian territory, still proves to be defensive behavior. Giving Ukraine long-range missiles means that it is aware of the consequences of using these weapons against a nuclear power, so some control is needed to avoid a serious escalation of the conflict.
If Russia were not a nuclear state, the weaknesses of its military would likely have encouraged NATO members to intervene militarily in the conflict as a collective defense alliance. But with President Putin’s threats and nuclear deterrence, that is impossible.
Ukraine joining NATO would be another provocation when we should be working to stop the war. It is worthwhile to leave the door open to accession, but in the short and medium term the conditions for opening the necessary dialogue with Russia are not met.
Nevertheless, accession to the European Union and the security guarantees associated with the armed presence of the allied forces are no longer impossible in the event of a ceasefire. Ukraine is unlikely to regain its territorial integrity militarily, either in Crimea or in the country’s eastern provinces. A ceasefire would give time for diplomacy, in return for security guarantees.
So, on the whole, it can be stated that some of the demands of the Ukrainian president cannot be fulfilled, and he himself knows this for sure.
General Denis Mercier at a NATO press conference in Lisbon on February 27, 2018
Europe continues to rely on the security guarantee of the United States through NATO, despite this, the concept of “strategic autonomy” is increasingly coming to the fore in European public discourse, i.e. the need for independent planning and production of military assets. To what extent do you think military independence from the United States is feasible, especially now, during the accumulating geopolitical crises (Ukraine, Gaza, Lebanon)?
It is still possible for Europe to reduce its exposure to the US, but the problem is that the vast majority of NATO members are not partners in this, and rather fear the US leaving Europe alone. The answer to the development of strategic autonomy should be sought in the NATO framework, not in another organization. This means that within NATO, with full transparency towards the USA, we must build a stronger European unit that is able to cooperate with the Americans and, if necessary, act independently.
Furthermore, European countries could better demonstrate their management and leadership skills if, taking into account the lessons of the war in Ukraine connected, interoperable, flexible and distributed structures that are compatible with NATO’s management system (C2, i.e. Command and Control), but are able to function without it. That would be a big step forward.
It is well known that insufficient defense capacities greatly hinder Europe’s independent action. What are the most critical capability gaps and duplications in the European defense industry that require immediate development? How can the EU focus on closing gaps while overcoming conflicting views of member states on a collective defense strategy?
First of all, it is important that the C2 control systems developed in Europe do not try to repeat (duplicate) the command structures already existing in NATO, but on the contrary, they build on the own capabilities of the European nations. Second, priority should be given to the new technologies that were used in the war in Ukraine. In particular, there is a need to focus on space, where Europe is too weak (for example, there is no alternative to Starlink), and on artificial intelligence in defense. Furthermore, new cooperation models must be developed.
Europe would need a thorough analysis of its industrial capacities. Not only for the defense industry, but also for raw material supply chains and the civilian sector – for example, the automotive industry, which could quickly switch to mass production in the event of war. Such an analysis would help assess which industries could quickly adapt to the requirements of a “war economy”.
Given the obstacles to a unified defense strategy, it would be worthwhile for the EU to follow a “two-speed Europe” approach, in which some member states, such as France and Germany, spend significantly more on military capabilities, and in which other countries invest much less in strategic autonomy, or do they rather rely on NATO’s defense guarantees?
What is needed is the possibility of group action in all international organizations, without the need for full agreement and participation of all members. The EU and NATO have also started this pooling and sharing through initiatives (whose essence is that the member states share and pool their resources with each other)to improve his military skills. This is a method that encourages you in all areas. It makes it possible to take advantage of the support of international organizations, but at the same time it bridges the problems of consensus agreements and provides great flexibility.
Source: www.economx.hu
