Annual reports from the State Department, the EU and non-governmental organizations across Europe show a wide range of techniques that Russia, through its levers of sharp power (including the SVR and the GRU), uses for political influence, writes a new analysis by the Digital Forensic Center – “Russian special forces in political games on the Balkans”.
According to the DFC, the analysis deals with the activities of GRU operatives in Europe and Montenegro.
“They present details about the implementation of such activities, which are believed to have as their goal a change in European politics and decision-making, and therefore the weakening of NATO and the EU. Acquittal verdict of the High Court in Podgorica for the case of attempted terrorism from 2016 cast a shadow over the role of two members of the Russian military intelligence agency GRU in that event. In the studies “The Role of Russia in the Balkans: The Case of Montenegro and Russian Hybrid Activities in the Western Balkans – Shadow Game”, the DFC pointed out the role of Russia and Russian state authorities in trying to stop Montenegro on its way to NATO and EU membership. -a.
According to the data of the British Institute for Security, RUSI – the Russian 161st Special Operations Center (Centr podgotovki specialistov special’nogo naslediniya), led by the DFC, was tasked with carrying out activities to prevent Montenegro from joining NATO in 2016.
“In the case known to the public as coup d’état from 2016, an active role was played by Vladimir Moiseev (Popov), a member of the special operations unit GRU 29155, which is subordinate to that center. He is still an active member of that unit today. Also, as a specialist in liquidations and sabotage, he was engaged in the first days of Russian aggression against Ukraine with the aim of physically liquidating the political leadership of that country in Kiev.”
The false name that Moiseyev has used since joining unit 29155 is Vladimir Popov, according to the DFC.
“Before his engagement in Montenegro, also under the code name Popov, he participated in sabotage and hybrid activities in Bulgaria and Moldova. In the special operations unit, he distinguished himself as an expert in explosives and improvised explosive devices, so in 2011 he was assigned to made an explosive device according to the exact specifications. From the letter he sent to his boss Andrej Averejanov in 2011, it can be seen how this unit was preparing for attacks on weapons warehouses in NATO member states use”.
Averyanov, DFC writes, is the commander of group 29155 and one of Vladimir Putin’s most trusted men from the para-intelligence sector. After the death of the leader of the Wagner paramilitary group Yevgeny Prigozhin, he was appointed in his place as the head of the GRU for operations in Africa and for the first time participated in meetings with Putin and other high-ranking representatives of the Kremlin.
“In June 2012, unknown perpetrators detonated an improvised explosive device in an ammunition warehouse in Bulgaria. The warehouse contained artillery ammunition that was supposed to be transported to Georgia. During that period, Georgia was acquiring weapons for its army because three years before that Russia carried out a military invasion of that country. According to the investigation carried out by the research network Belingcat, it was established that the members of unit 29155 were responsible for this sabotage in Ukraine, transfer by car to the Bulgarian city of Varna on the Black Sea”.
The analysis adds that Moiseyev was in Bulgaria immediately before the second sabotage in the ammunition warehouse in Bulgaria on March 21, 2015, and that he met there with GRU colonel Ivan Terentiev, who is Andrey Averjanov’s first deputy.
“Moisejev arrived in Bulgaria with the same passport he had with him entered Serbia just before the parliamentary elections in Montenegro in 2016. years. As in Serbia, he presented himself as a marine insurance agent and his passport was in the name of Vladimir Popov. In the sabotage of unit 29155 in Bulgaria, three people died and 18 were wounded. Those explosions caused a seismic earthquake measuring 1.5 on the Richter scale. According to publicly available data, the fake passports used by GRU agents when traveling or preparing those sabotages had the same serial numbers, as was the case with the passports of GRU agents Alexander Myshkin and Anatoly Chepiga, who are suspected of poisoning former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal in Great Britain”.
According to the DFC analysis, it is indicative that in 2014, according to the findings of the security services of Moldova, Moiseyev participated in an attempt to destabilize that country before the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU.
“According to those statements, during that period he organized training for local paramilitary formations from Moldova in Rostov (Russia). Moldova is under attack from Russian hybrid activities because of its pro-European aspirations. The region of Transnistria declared independence from Moldova in 1990. In that region “there are 1,500 Russian soldiers who call themselves members of the peacekeeping mission. After the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Moldova expressed concern that Russia could use Transnistria to launch a new front against Ukraine.”
Another Russian citizen whose name is associated with the case of attempted terrorism in Montenegro is a member of the GRU, Eduard Šišmakov, writes DFC.
“Shishmakov traveled to Serbia in 2016 under the name Eduard Shirokov. A passport bearing the name Shirokov was issued by Russian state authorities in August 2016, two months before the coup attempt. Shishmakov is a high-ranking GRU operative who, since 2013, has served as Russian naval attache in Poland. He participated in a high-level security meeting with the Polish Security Council on January 24, 2014. In the same year, Shishmakov was declared persona non grata in Poland. He has a residential address in St. Petersburg, and according to Bellingket, that address belongs to a corporate housing complex owned by the GRU”.
The presence of GRU agents in Belgrade immediately before and after the parliamentary elections in Montenegro is indisputable, according to the analysis.
“From the records of Hotel Majestic in Belgrade, it can be seen that Vladimir Moisejev (Popov) stayed in that hotel four times from September 29 to October 22, 2016. It is indicative that Moisejev listed Nikita Minin as the contact person when registering at the Hotel associate in the magazine Marine insurance. Belingket later established that this magazine was a cover for the GRU for the travel of members of this unit to European countries, as well as that Mina was a former member of the Russian special operations unit. Spetsnaz 48427. The investigation also showed that the mentioned GRU agents possessed legal passports while they were in Belgrade, but under false names. It turned out to be the same batch of passports used by Russian spies in the Skripal poisoning attempt. Like their colleagues from the GRU, Anatoly Chepiga and Alexander Myshkin, who are suspected in the Skripal case, Moiseyev and Shishmakov are in Russian databases with two parallel identities,” the analysis reads.
The interest of the domestic and international public in the case of attempted terrorism culminated after the Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, on October 24, 2016, informed the public about the attempt to destabilize Montenegro.
“Undisputed facts that point to what the then prime minister of Serbia called foreign element they can be seen in the evidence that the state authorities of Serbia gave to Montenegro. At the press conference, Aleksandar Vučić stated that the security authorities of Serbia found irrefutable and material evidence that, among other things, various illegal activities for the territory of Montenegro were being prepared on the territory of Serbia. Vučić said that certain persons followed the movement of the Prime Minister of Montenegro from day to day, from minute to minute, and informed other persons about it. He mentioned that among the evidence related to the planned activities in Montenegro are photographs, recordings, uniforms, direct confessions and confiscated money in the amount of 125 thousand euros, and that some persons were detained and are under the control of the Serbian authorities, specifying that they worked with people who can be said to have an element of foreignness. Also, according to Vučić, the Prime Minister of Montenegro is monitored using the most modern equipment that only the most powerful countries in the world possess,” the analysis reads.
The forensic examination of the seized phones established that their operating systems had been modified (rooting), i.e. that it was indisputably established that the confiscated phones were prepared and had the possibility that they could not be tapped.
“In addition to the seized, the transfer of money that Eduard Šišmakov sent to the witness associate Sinđelić on September 25, 2016, is also indisputable, which was confirmed by an independent investigation by the FBI, as well as official data of the bank through which the transaction was carried out. Ananije Nikić is suspected of creating a criminal organization that tried to carry out a coup in Montenegro. According to the testimony of the witness Slavko Nikić in the court proceedings, Ananije Nikić introduced him to a member of the FSB for special tasks and asked him to do something on the territory of Montenegro that would arouse the interest of the general public. Ananije Nikić was arrested in Russia on an interpol warrant, but the Russian Federation granted him political asylum at the end of 2017, according to the DFC analysis.
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Source: www.vijesti.me
