Since mid-November, the specter of clandestine war has once again hovered over the Baltic Sea, more than two years after the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines on September 26, 2022. Two submarine telecommunications cables internal to the European Union (EU) were indeed cut: one linking Sweden and Lithuania, on Sunday November 17, then the next day another between Germany and Finland. Suspicions of sabotage are strong because these infrastructures were damaged in the space of a few hours and the activities of a Chinese ship in the area remain difficult to establish.
Map of the Baltic Sea and the countries bordering it, showing the location of submarine cables in the area, including the ‘C-Lion1’ cable between Germany and Finland and the ‘Arelion’ cable, which connects the island from Gotland to Lithuania, both affected on November 17 and 18, 2024. | Cléa Péculier, Thierno Toure / AFP
This episode revives the fears which had developed throughout the 2010 decade and which had culminated with the explosion of gas pipelines directly connecting the Russian region of Saint Petersburg and northern Germany, in order to supply industry across the Rhine with inexpensive energy. They have long been criticized by Poland and Ukraine, which it bypasses by sea; they were denounced as a mistake by the United States and the Baltic States in the fight against European dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. But this episode was the culmination of a decade of tensions.
A contact zone between NATO and Russia
Europeans are rightly wondering: will the Baltic Sea soon become a zone of extreme tension again, calmed for a time by the postponement of military activities on the continent in Ukraine? Everything indicates that the trend observed in the 2010s is resuming: incursions by non-European submarines into the very shallow territorial waters of the coastal states; sovereignty tests in very confined airspaces; cyberattacks against more vulnerable rivals such as the Baltic states; military pressure from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, inserted between Poland and Lithuania.
The risks of a resurgence of clandestine operations – underwater, at the edge of airspace or in cyberspace – are all the greater as Sweden and Finland have, since then, joins NATO and that Russia has, since 2022, developed its mastery of aerial and naval drones. Before 2022, the Baltic Sea was still an intermediate zone or a bumpy buffer zone during regular military exercises (BALTOPSFor example). But it is now, like the Black Sea, a region of direct contact between NATO and Russia, hence the creation by Moscow of a new military zone in the North-West.
The greater Baltic area – in its maritime, land, air and cyber dimensions – is of vital interest to the European Union, long before it was a “NATO lake”. What is at stake in this region is almost 40% of the European Union’s GDP. That’s 80 million Europeans (if we take the region in the broad sense). In addition, for six EU member states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, even Sweden), very dynamic commercially, industrially and technologically, it is the only outlet on international waters.
The Baltic Sea is “Mare Europaeum”
For major global military and economic powers other than the European Union, the Baltic Sea is secondary. The United States has not established bases there, such as in Soúda Bay in Crete (a naval base) or at Incirlik in southern Turkey (an air base). The People’s Republic of China does not consider it as one of its international transit routes like the South Asian straits, the Suez Canal or the Northern Sea Route. As for Russia, it gives priority in resources to the Arctic and the Black Sea, as evidenced by the limited number of ships deployed.
The Baltic Sea is “Mare Europaeum”. Europeans must step up their security against asymmetric threats, clandestine operations and “tests” of sovereignty. Above all, they must not fall asleep with the idea that the Ukrainian front is far from the region and that the presence of NATO everywhere around the area alone ensures tranquility.
The Baltic Sea is the laboratory for the security of Europeans by Europeans. The submarine cables episode may only be a test. If the Europeans mobilize in the area, militarily, diplomatically, economically and technologically, they still have time to assert their interests.
Source: www.slate.fr
