«NYes, the tank is not dead, but it must be used wisely. » As summarized by a colonel interviewed in 2023 at the National Assembly, the tank is far from being abandoned by the general staffs. The fact remains that these machines, whose design has not evolved much since the Cold War, are at the heart of in-depth reflection, both for the military and for industrialists. Videos of hundreds of charred carcasses or deadly attacks on armored vehicles in combat zones in Ukraine are regularly found on social networks. In this high-intensity conflict, ultra-fast missiles, FPV drones (for First person view, equipped with an on-board camera and remote control), which explode at the most vulnerable places on the tank body, and logistical problems explain this situation.
While they were designed to engage directly with their heavy frontal armor and firepower, very few tanks have been used in this fashion since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine. Hidden under vegetation or in buildings, they are now used to support infantrymen during rapid and targeted actions or for indirect fire, that is to say bell shooting beyond the line of vision. Faced with the shortage of guns, Ukraine and Russia are resorting to tanks, sometimes obsolete, for lack of anything better. “Using them like this is a waste, because artillery is much more suitable, explains Marc Chassillan, former engineer of the armaments corps and consultant specializing in defense issues. The amplitude of their barrel does not exceed 17 to 18 degrees. This pointing limitation prevents them from reaching targets located more than ten kilometers away. An artillery gun has an amplitude of up to 60 degrees, which allows it to fire up to 40 kilometers.”
Mobility and reinforced armor
If the doctrine of armored cavalry was adapted to certain asymmetrical combats during the 20th century, in conflicts opposing traditional armies to guerrillas, it always revolves around three fundamentals: mobility, firepower and protection “This triptych is unchanged, because it makes it possible to quickly create a breakthrough on the battlefield to shift the balance of power, underlines Lieutenant-Colonel Christian, from the Army’s studies and foresight department. But, in the Ukrainian conflict, it is called into question because a frozen front is not a good theater of operations for armored cavalry.”
For the time being, staffs are counting on two pillars to protect their tanks. The first is mobility, which has proven itself for artillery and Caesar cannons and which remains essential to prevent them from being too easy to target. The second is based on several devices put in place by the crews to protect themselves during impacts. In addition to armor plates, metal cages, called “cope cages”, were installed on the weakest parts of the armored vehicles, such as the roof and the engine, to trap drones or rocket heads. The device makes it possible to move the detonation away and therefore limit the damage. In Israel, a system called Trophy, which automatically triggers countermeasures to ward off incoming missiles and rockets, has also emerged.
For its part, the French army will once again teach indirect fire in its shooting centers. Thanks to the Scorpion modernization program, the cavalry will be able to implement a new organization. “It is a chain of pulsations in which cavalry units are able to act dispersed on the battlefield to make themselves less vulnerable, specifies Lieutenant-Colonel Christian. In the event of short notice, they can be refocused to focus the effort on a given location and disperse immediately.” Designed at the end of the Cold War to face an invasion of Soviet armor, the Leclerc tank benefited from a renovation as part of the XLR program. It provides for the installation of new sights, a remotely operated turret machine gun, reinforcement of the floor and protection of the flanks. Developed for the anti-guerrilla fight, these improvements are considered too slight by some observers, at a time of the return of high-intensity warfare.
In a longer term vision, tank architecture is being reviewed by several countries. “The idea is to build much lighter and more maneuverable vehicles to avoid fire rather than survive it,” observes Yohann Michel, research fellow at the Institute for Strategy and Defense Studies. Thus the United States has already taken into account feedback from the war in Ukraine for the next version of its Abrams tank, scheduled for the end of the decade. Called M1E3, the future machine should weigh around ten tonnes less than the current Abrams, with a reinforced roof, active protection against missiles and a quieter engine. For their part, France and Germany are continuing their tank of the future project, the MGCS (for Main ground combat system, in French). Capable of firing from further distances, better protecting its crew and implementing collaborative combat, it should replace the Leclerc from 2040.
France reviews its helicopter strategy
Anti-aircraft defense, surface-to-air missiles, drones… In flight or on the tarmac, helicopters have become prime targets in Ukraine. Drones capable of destroying armored vehicles or buildings and costing only a few hundred thousand euros have given military staff pause. In February, the United States abandoned development of a new generation of attack helicopters. For the US Army, there is no longer any question of risking the life of a pilot when a drone or a satellite can replace him during a reconnaissance mission. On the other hand, the French Army is not prepared to draw a line under these devices. Despite the cancellation of a major modernization – after Germany’s withdrawal – France will still have 67 Tiger attack helicopters in service in 2025. Its military strategy is based on very low altitude flight, far behind the enemy lines, preferably at night. And what’s next? Camouflage, more efficient logistics, reduction of the thermal footprint, coordination with drones, protection against cyberattacks… There are many avenues to allow the Tiger to remain up to date until the end of its service, scheduled for 2045 .
You are reading an article from L’Usine Nouvelle 3736 – November 2024
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Source: www.usinenouvelle.com
