WILLIAM Donovan was certainly not the type to be fooled! It is interesting to point out that in the region at that moment SOE (British intelligence service) had an obvious numerical superiority.
After the war, the SOE was disbanded, while the OSS (American Special Operations Service) was put on hiatus. Later, the OSS grew into the CIA, which today certainly represents an older relative in relations with the services of friendly countries, such as MI 6 (more precisely, SIS, Secret Intelligence Service) in Britain.
Thus, Donovan proposed to the command the establishment of a “joint SOE – OSS operational committee” in Cairo and, interestingly, “with an emphasis on the military rather than the political aspect”. This was an example of classic American policy, such as General George K. Marshall’s position that support Eisenhower, allowing the Red Army to capture Berlin in order not to risk the lives of Allied soldiers, which otherwise would have been a purely political decision in the interest of the West, which would have captured Berlin before the Soviet Union.
All operational orders were carefully prepared by this joint body, primarily in the general allied interest, not specific members. Every Allied-backed guerilla organization was required to appoint an “authorized representative” in Cairo. To that end, the Soviet Union also adopted appropriate liaison procedures with the OSS and SOE. This last statement is unintentionally ironic, given that we now know as quite a number of OSS agents also worked for the NKVD, so the Soviets knew what was going on.
Donovan, in his report, reminds the Joint Command at the end: “Knowing of the desire of the political leaders of Greece and Yugoslavia to turn America against Britain and both against the Soviet Union, which was intensified by our current attitude of saying nothing to them, we immediately put them to knowledge that the Moscow Conference strengthened all three nations in their war effort, and that the Balkan countries must harmonize their demands with the interests of this joint enterprise.”
This sounded clear. But what if they were forced to use ammunition exclusively in the fight against the Germans, and not against rivals in the civil war?
In JANUARY 1944, the OSS prepared an internal report on the direction in which the rapid change in the situation in Yugoslavia was moving. It states that the king feels that he is a “hostage of the fanatical Greater Serbs”, which certainly harmed the allied cause and benefited the interests of the enemy. Due to the lack of independent sources of information about the situation in the country, many patriotic pre-war Yugoslav politicians tried to cooperate with Tito in intentions of forming a new government in exile…
Tito was now receiving heaps of Allied equipment, his credo being “beat the enemy everywhere and always…despite significant losses”. Then the Americans learned that the British were abandoning Mihailović and directing their full focus towards Tito. An American source informs that at a meeting Churchill confirmed that “Tito is very useful to them”. According to Churchill, “the partisans are fighting masterfully”. The British very openly told the Americans the reasons for changing their support in favor of the partisans – this, as we know, is ULTRA material , but this was not to be revealed to the OSS at the time.
Partisans in contact with the Americans did not hide their communist beliefs. The British reported to their OSS colleagues that even without indoctrination “many capable officers become Communists”.
In other words, the open communist commitment of the partisan movement was obvious – America and Britain entered into a new relationship with Tito with their eyes wide open.
Although some clearly contested, as we have seen, the possibility that Tito would create a communist state after the war, it was obvious who was in charge and who was at the head of the group that killed the most Germans. That short-term goal, to hold and mop up as many Wehrmacht divisions as possible while the Allied forces gradually advanced northward on the Italian peninsula, was of the utmost importance to the would-be victors. We must not lose sight of the fact that this is a joint policy of America and Britain, so that those who favor the communist moles in SOE Cairo as the cause, it must be clear that above all there were the interests of the Allies. There is no question that they were deceived – on the contrary, they knew very well what to do. It is not disputed that in the ranks of SOE Cairo, as well as SOE London, there were convinced communists – whether active agents of the NKVD or not – however, the decisions made first by the British, and later by the Americans, were based solely on urgent military needs. More German deaths in Yugoslavia meant more Allied lives in Italy, plain as day.
The conclusion of the OSS memorandum indicates that American action will nevertheless lead to consequences: “There is no doubt that Tito’s movement is taking a leading role and influencing other partisan movements in Southeastern Europe, and that such movements will gain in importance and scope in relation to on reducing the German presence in the Balkans. Therefore, it would be wise for the United States to avoid a position that would resemble our desire to support, to the extreme, groups hostile to the Partisans, which would make them appear reactionary, anti-democratic, or outright fascist, with the suspicion that we want cooperation with the Germans. , we support discord and civil war. If the partisan movement based on the Yugoslav model will represent the wave of the future in Southeastern Europe, and the information points in that direction, we must consider the option of whether our allies, at the height of their success, will throw us into the abyss, or whether we will lose ourselves in the eyes of the Balkan peoples, due to our inattention and find in it themselves, despite their rather great affection for our country.”
MIHAILOVIĆ IS THE PAST
On February 22, 1944, WINSTON Churchill finally “turned off the tap” on Mihailović and the Chetniks. Although the die of fate was cast at the end of 1943, everything finally became public in early 1944. Understandably, although he could not talk about the ULTRA documents and the real reasons behind his decision, he did quote advice from Bill Deakin when speaking in the House of Commons. Tito was a hero, and Mihailović was a thing of the past. The change was implemented, the break with Mihailović was final. When it comes to Yugoslavia, Churchill was a pragmatist. With his “dishonorable document” from 1944, he convinced Stalin to accept the “half-and-half” sphere of interest for Yugoslavia. So when Tito left the Soviets in 1948, Stalin kept his word and did not send the Red Army to retake the country. Churchill’s and Stalin’s interesting “deal with the devil” thus saved Tito’s head.
End
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Source: www.novosti.rs
