What else can happen in the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel?

The open war between Israel and Hezbollah is not a future scenario, but a reality, even if no one wants to use that term yet. It will last as long as it lasts, but the figures are not of a “crisis”, “violence”, or “fever”. There is no precedent for 500 deaths in one day in the last 20 years. They are on the Lebanese side, among them there are children, women and the elderly. There are more than 100,000 displaced people, plus 60,000 on the Israeli side. Each drama is unique, growing rapidly these days, despite the tedium of those who think that in the Middle East the natural thing is to kill each other.

Tel Aviv’s escalation of attacks against alleged Shiite party-militia targets has intensified after 11 months of sustained conflict with ups and downs, following Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the Israeli response in the form of an endless offensive in Gaza. We have the funerals, the evacuated houses, the transfer of troops, but little is clear about what may come. From a greater intensification of the bombings to the ground offensive, from Hezbollah’s harsh response to a measured response, from the entry into the fray of allies such as the United States or Iran to the cessation of hostilities if a ceasefire is reached in the Palestinian strip.

The ultra-nationalist government of Benjamin Netanyahu has been taking steps growing upIn the nearly year since it began attacking Gaza and Hezbollah retaliated in solidarity with Palestine, 8,500 cross-border operations have been carried out on both sides of the Lebanese border, three-quarters of which were launched by Tel Aviv, According to data from experts at the International Crisis Group collected between October 2023 and July of this year. Israel claims that the Party of God, for its part, has launched 8,000 rockets during this time against military and civilian facilities. Despite everything, both sides avoided going any further.

In the past week, everything has accelerated. First, Israel changed its war aims to include the northern front, with the stated aim of allowing Israelis who had been forced to leave their homes because of Hezbollah’s rockets and missiles to return. Then, it launched its double attack on the group’s pagers and walkie-talkies (classified as terrorist by the European Union and the United States), sabotaging its communications. Next, it carried out “selective” attacks in Beirut, the Lebanese capital, focusing on the Rawdan Unit, which was decapitated but at the cost of nearby civilians. A few hours later, the bombings became massive, “preventive” according to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), targeting missile silos. And since September 21, the waves of air strikes have been daily, broad-brush, openly crushing.

Netanyahu’s cabinet says that arsenals, depots and rocket and missile launching sites are being attacked and that there are still “thousands of targets” left to hit. He says he will do “everything that needs to be done” to calm the border and to make sure that homes on his side are inhabited again. “We are facing difficult days. I promised that we would change the balance of power in the north and that is exactly what we are doing,” he said yesterday, in his first major speech to assess what is happening.

Netanyahu’s options…

What else can he order? Alex Plitsas, an analyst at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative (an American think tank), explains which, in his view, depends on what Hezbollah does, which “has refused to move its forces from near the Israeli border to the Litani River, approximately 25 kilometers to the north, as demanded United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701which stipulates that all forces other than UN peacekeepers or the Lebanese army must evacuate the site.”

“Bombing of Hezbollah targets in Beirut and elsewhere in the country could continue if Hezbollah refuses to budge on the issue of moving north of the Litani River,” he said. If that fails, “Israel will likely be forced to launch a ground invasion in southern Lebanon to drive Hezbollah out,” which has not happened since the 2006 war. “While this would be a significant military expansion for the Netanyahu government, there appears to be broad political support for it,” he said. Polls show him winning again if there were elections, despite his collapse following the Hamas attack and mass protests calling for a ceasefire in Gaza to bring the hostages home, and even the main opposition parties would support a larger onslaught in Lebanon.

If the expected damage is not done by air strikes, a study will be made of whether a ground invasion of southern Lebanon is necessary. “To do this, it would be necessary for armoured units, artillery, infantry and special forces to patrol the area, carry out raids and attack Hezbollah positions,” which requires a significant investment in resources and manpower, which is not easy when Gaza is already under attack and when the deployment of uniformed personnel has multiplied in the West Bank, a less-attended territory but where the level of violence is also the worst in two decades.

“Israel would prefer to avoid doing so,” Plitsas said of the possibility of putting boots on the ground, “given the risk it poses to ground forces, but if (Netanyahu) considers a ground invasion a necessary step, he can try to soften the battlefield as much as possible through airstrikes, as he has done in Gaza, before deploying ground forces,” he added.

Netanyahu is supported by his team and by the polls, he avoids focusing attention on the anniversary of the siege of Gaza, he stretches the rope knowing that the US cannot go too far against him when we are two months away from the presidential elections and the Jewish or pro-Israeli vote counts… That is why there are many Israeli analysts who say that entering Lebanese soil will be “inevitable”, even if the current bombings continue for days or weeks.

“Almost a year into the Gaza war, with the Israeli army deployed across Gaza, the West Bank and the north, and with the Israeli economy beginning to feel the impact of it all, some officials believe that Israel has a growing interest in turning the war of attrition (in Lebanon) into a short, decisive campaign that would change the security reality on the ground (…) and deter Hezbollah from further attacks,” explains, for example, the think tank británico International Crisis Group.

In addition, it would achieve one more thing: forcing Hezbollah to abandon its demand for a ceasefire in Gaza as a prerequisite for calm in northern Israel and also to withdraw its forces from the border. Two for one.

…and those of Nasrallah

It is also not easy to predict what Hezbollah, the other leg of the conflict, will do. Israel has left the party-militia in a very weakened position after the attacks on its communication systems and the subsequent bombings, which have affected all levels of the organization, from the base to the top. Therefore, it is understandable that Israel, in its mindset, believes that now is a good time to continue striking in order to knock out Hassan Nasrallah’s men and change the situation on the border once and for all.

The gamble is risky because, although the Shiite radicals are wounded, they still have more than enough capacity to respond, with an arsenal ranging from 120,000 to 150,000 projectiles, most of which have been provided by Iran, their godfather and sponsor. In recent years, they have acquired missiles and rockets with greater range and precision, with which every corner of Israel is in their sights. Tel Aviv has the reliable Iron Dome to protect its skies, but one of its weak points is that when it is subjected to a massive attack it collapses. This happened in the multiple Hamas attack last year.

So far, that has not happened. Hezbollah is responding to Israel in a small way, so as not to show weakness, but it is possible that it is disorganized, after the enemy intelligence blow, and that it is difficult to give and execute orders with the current communications gaps and the lack of members killed or wounded by the explosions and bombings. The hole is large and the Mossad, the Israeli secret services, must be acquiring timely and accurate data on its rival.

However, Hezbollah has warned Israel that if it launches a ground incursion it must prepare for the “deadly trap” it will encounter. If in Gaza the danger was guerrillas in the narrow streets of the Strip, now we are talking about mined terrain, full of traps and hiding places, which the militants know like the back of their hand, ideal for ambushes, as seen in the previous wars of 1982 and 2006.

It will be crucial in the days to come to see what Tehran will do, which has insisted in these months of sustained crisis that it does not want a major global conflict with incalculable consequences, that it does not have sufficient military power or money (sanctions weigh) to undertake an adventure of such magnitude. Iran can ask its country to be prudent. proxy Lebanese, so as not to be left without its firepower if it needs it at another time to control Israel.

Its current president, the newcomer Masoud Pezeshkian, has already told Tel Aviv that they will not fall into its “trap.” This may be referring to the pressure on Hezbollah to spend and spend and run out of arsenal. To respond with many launches, Nasrallah should have the OK from the ayatollahs, because of the expense involved. But falling short in response, apart from not being good for his defense, means showing a fragile image. Until now, the leader of Hezbollah has been disciplined towards those who help him, but we are in a new scenario, where there is more chaos and everything is more volatile and a historic defeat is threatening.

Of course, the entry of Iran into the game – and its satellites in Yemen or Iraq – would also force the US to do the same to defend Israel. And then we would have not just a regional war, but a global war, a total war. Lebanon would be its battlefield, with stratospheric effects for a country that never manages to get back on its feet.

That is why it is essential that those who can still mediate do so. We are talking, above all, about Washington, which is the one that has the capacity to pressure Netanyahu not to deepen the offensive and which can move through diplomatic channels some proposals to Hezbollah. Above all, it is the one that can force a ceasefire in Gaza, which will lead to other peace.

If Hezbollah responds fiercely, Israel could present this as a reason to escalate operations in a defensive “war of necessity,” terms already used in the past. A few weeks before the US presidential election, Joe Biden’s government seems determined to avoid such a scenario and has therefore said that Israel should refrain from escalating hostilities to the point of making a diplomatic solution impossible. Words, for now. At least in public, no other gestures are seen. Same situation as with the EU. There is no talk, of course, of any sanctions against Israel for the civilians who are dying alongside the Shiite militiamen or of withholding defensive material.

According to local media, Israel believes it can handle a major offensive and is confident that there will be no major strikes from the other side. That the cost is bearable. November is not far off and Republican Donald Trump may return to the White House, which also puts pressure on Netanyahu in the Oval Office. The problem is that the window of opportunity for negotiations that these past few months, despite everything, seemed open, is now closing. And fast.

We have seen it before, and although both sides can avoid it, “it seems that the hard logic of war is stronger than the soft logic of peace,” As veteran David Ignatius writes, terrified by this crisis,historic correspondent in the Middle East in The Washington PostHe says it is all “eerily similar” to 1982. Israel, he says, has the “military dominance” and “dazzling intelligence” of that time, but also the same problem: it never knows how to answer the question “how does this end?” “The only thing that seems clear to me is that total victory is an illusion in this conflict,” he concludes.